Note to Broadcasters: The following is a speech delivered by Freddy Sonakile in the North West Provincial Legislature.
- DA calls for mandatory, independent lifestyle audits of North West political office-bearers.
- Declarations alone are not enough – public representatives must be subject to credible verification.
- Public power must be accompanied by public accountability.
I rise to move this motion because the integrity of public office cannot depend solely on declarations made by public representatives; it must also depend on credible mechanisms through which those declarations and the financial circumstances of those entrusted with public power can, where legally permissible, be independently verified.
The principle is straightforward: those who exercise public power and have responsibility over public resources must be subject to the highest standards of transparency, accountability and ethical conduct.
This motion is therefore not premised on the assumption that public representatives are corrupt. It is premised on the opposite principle: that legitimate public representatives should have no objection to a lawful, independent and properly regulated mechanism that confirms that their declared financial interests and lifestyles are consistent with legitimate sources of income.
THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Honourable Speaker, we must begin with the law.
Section 195 of the Constitution establishes the basic values and principles governing public administration, including a high standard of professional ethics, accountability and transparency. Section 125 places executive authority in the province in the Premier and Executive Council, while section 133 provides for the accountability of MECs to the provincial legislature.
Members of the Executive are also already subject to the Executive Members’ Ethics Act 82 of 1998 and the Executive Ethics Code. That framework requires disclosure of financial interests and regulates conflicts between public responsibilities and private interests.
The Legislature similarly has an established ethical and disclosure regime for its Members, including declarations of financial interests and the office of the Integrity Commissioner.
Therefore, this motion does not seek to create an entirely new ethical regime where none exists.
It seeks to address a weakness that exists in any system based substantially on disclosure: disclosure is not the same as verification.
A declaration tells the institution what a public representative says their interests are. A lifestyle audit provides a mechanism to test whether the available information is consistent with that declaration and with legitimate income and financial circumstances.
That distinction is important.
THIS IS ABOUT VERIFICATION, NOT CRIMINALISING WEALTH
The purpose of a lifestyle audit is not to criminalise wealth, success or legitimate private interests. It is not an automatic finding of corruption, and an adverse or concerning finding cannot, by itself, substitute for a criminal investigation or a proper disciplinary or judicial process.
Its purpose is to identify material discrepancies, unexplained wealth, undeclared interests, potential conflicts of interest or other credible financial red flags that warrant further examination.
That is entirely consistent with a broader system of ethical governance.
Where an audit identifies no concerns, the public representative is protected by the process because there is an independent basis for confirming that their affairs are in order. Where credible concerns arise, those concerns can be referred to the appropriate institution in accordance with the law.
The objective is therefore neither punishment nor political persecution. It is early detection, prevention, accountability and public confidence.
WHY POLITICAL OFFICE-BEARERS?
Honourable Speaker,
There is a legitimate question that must be answered: if lifestyle audits already exist within the public service, why should political office-bearers be subjected to an additional mechanism?
The answer is precisely because political office-bearers occupy positions of political authority.
The state has already developed mechanisms requiring senior public servants to account for their financial interests and, increasingly, to undergo lifestyle auditing. It would be difficult to defend a system in which officials exercising administrative authority are subject to increasingly sophisticated financial scrutiny while the political leadership responsible for policy, appointments, oversight and executive decisions is subjected only to declarations.
The ethical principle should be consistent.
If we expect a senior official to explain their financial interests, assets and lifestyle, then political leaders should be prepared to meet an equivalent standard.
The issue is therefore not whether political representatives should be singled out unfairly. The issue is whether political authority should carry a lower standard of financial accountability than administrative authority.
I do not believe it should.
WHO IMPLEMENTS THE PROPOSAL?
Honourable Speaker, I anticipate that one of the principal objections to this motion will be that the Legislature cannot simply impose a new administrative system without identifying the institution legally responsible for implementing it.
That is a valid procedural consideration, and the motion should therefore be framed accordingly.
For the Premier and Members of the Executive Council, implementation must be undertaken through the Premier and Executive Council within the existing constitutional and legislative framework governing the provincial Executive.
For Members of this Legislature, the mechanism must operate through the Legislature’s own institutional and ethical framework, including the Speaker, relevant committees, the Integrity Commissioner and any other structure lawfully established for this purpose.
Where national legislation must be amended to create a uniform framework applicable to political office-bearers across spheres, this Legislature can and should call upon the appropriate national institutions to initiate that process.
In other words, this motion does not ask the Legislature to unlawfully assume executive functions or to establish an auditing agency overnight.
It asks the Legislature to adopt a policy position and require the appropriate constitutional institutions to develop an implementable, lawful and independent mechanism.
That distinction is important.
THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK MUST BE STRENGTHENED WHERE NECESSARY
We should also be honest that a comprehensive lifestyle-audit regime for political office-bearers may require amendments to legislation, strengthening of existing rules or the development of additional institutional policies.
That should not be presented as a reason not to proceed.
It should be part of the resolution.
The motion should therefore call upon the Premier and Executive Council to assess the legislative and regulatory amendments required for the implementation of mandatory lifestyle audits for Members of the Executive, while the Legislature should review its own rules and ethical framework in relation to Members of the Legislature.
Where national legislation is implicated, the provincial government should engage the relevant national departments, Parliament and other competent institutions.
A serious anti-corruption policy cannot be defeated simply because the current framework is incomplete.
If the law needs strengthening, then we strengthen the law.
THE QUESTION OF FUNDING
Honourable Speaker, another anticipated objection is the issue of funding.
I accept that lifestyle audits are not cost-free. Independent forensic examinations, data analysis, verification of financial information and professional investigative services require resources.
But that does not mean that the proposal is financially irresponsible.
The appropriate approach is to require implementation within the applicable budgetary and procurement framework, with the responsible institution determining the appropriate funding mechanism.
The Legislature itself should not purport to appropriate money it does not control.
Instead, the resolution should require the Executive, through the normal provincial budget process, to identify the resources necessary for implementation, while the Legislature exercises oversight over whether that commitment is actually honoured.
Implementation could also be phased, prioritised according to risk and integrated with existing institutional mechanisms rather than creating unnecessary parallel structures.
The cost of accountability must, however, be considered against the cost of failing to detect corruption, conflicts of interest and unexplained wealth.
The proper question is therefore not simply, “What will the audits cost?”
It is also:
“What does it cost the people of North West when corruption is not detected?”
Every rand lost through corruption is a rand that cannot be spent on roads, scholar transport, policing, healthcare, education or other public priorities.
Preventative accountability therefore has a legitimate place within responsible financial governance.
INDEPENDENCE AND DUE PROCESS
Honourable Speaker, the credibility of such a system will depend on its independence.
A political office-bearer should not determine the outcome of their own audit. Political parties should not determine whether an adverse finding is legitimate. The system must therefore provide for appropriately qualified and independent auditors or institutions, appointed through lawful procurement or other legally authorised mechanisms.
The process must also comply with the Constitution and applicable legislation, including the right to privacy, confidentiality and procedural fairness.
A lifestyle audit cannot become a licence for arbitrary intrusion into the private lives of public representatives.
At the same time, the right to privacy cannot be interpreted as a right to conceal financial interests relevant to the lawful exercise of public office.
The appropriate balance is a regulated process that defines what information may be obtained, how it may be verified, who may access it, how confidential information is protected and how findings are dealt with.
That is precisely why the framework must be legally sound before implementation.
THE STANDARD MUST APPLY EQUALLY
Honourable Speaker,
This proposal should apply without regard to political affiliation.
It must not become a mechanism through which one political party investigates another. It must be an institutional mechanism applicable to political office-bearers according to objective criteria.
If the Premier undergoes an audit, the opposition must be prepared to undergo one.
If an MEC undergoes an audit, an MPL must be prepared to undergo one.
And if I sponsor this motion, I must be prepared to subject myself to the same standard.
I have said publicly that I drive a Ford Mustang, and I understand that public representatives’ lifestyles will naturally attract public scrutiny.
I have no objection to that scrutiny.
If my financial affairs are legitimate, an independent process should confirm that.
The same principle must apply to everyone.
OUR PROPOSAL
Honourable Speaker, this motion should therefore result in a resolution that is both principled and implementable.
We propose that this House call upon the Premier and Executive Council to develop and implement, within the applicable constitutional, legislative, regulatory and budgetary framework, a mandatory, independent and periodic lifestyle-audit mechanism for the Premier and Members of the Executive Council.
The House should further call upon the appropriate structures of this Legislature to strengthen the existing financial-disclosure and ethical framework applicable to Members of the Provincial Legislature by introducing an independent and periodic verification mechanism, including lifestyle audits where legally permissible.
The framework should provide for appropriate verification of declared financial interests, assets, liabilities, income, business interests and other relevant financial information; establish clear criteria for identifying material discrepancies and potential conflicts of interest; provide for confidentiality, privacy and due process; and ensure that credible findings are referred to the appropriate oversight, investigative or law-enforcement institution where warranted.
The House should further require the responsible institutions to report to the Legislature on the legislative, institutional, financial and administrative measures necessary to give effect to the resolution within a defined period.
Where amendments to national legislation are necessary, the Premier should engage the relevant national institutions to promote a consistent framework for political office-bearers across government.
That is not an abstract demand.
It identifies the responsible institutions, the legal framework, the funding process, the need for independence, the safeguards and the mechanism for parliamentary oversight.
CONCLUSION
Honourable Speaker,
South Africans have every reason to demand higher standards from those who exercise public power.
We have seen the consequences of weak oversight, undisclosed interests, conflicts of interest and corruption. We have seen how public resources can be diverted from communities into private hands when accountability mechanisms fail.
The answer cannot be that we simply trust political office-bearers because they have made declarations.
The answer must be to build systems that allow those declarations to be appropriately verified.
This motion does not presume guilt. It does not criminalise wealth. It does not disregard existing legislation. It does not ask the Legislature to spend money it does not have. It does not ignore constitutional rights or institutional boundaries.
It asks for the existing framework to be strengthened, properly funded, independently implemented and subjected to legislative oversight.
Most importantly, it asks political leaders to accept the same principle that we rightly demand throughout government:
Public power must be accompanied by public accountability.
If our financial affairs are legitimate, independent scrutiny protects us.
If our declarations are accurate, verification strengthens public confidence.
And if credible discrepancies exist, the state must have the institutional capacity to identify them and act lawfully.
That is the standard we should set for political leadership in the North West.
I therefore urge this House to support the motion.